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PRIVATIZATION OF THE BUILDING
INSPECTION FUNCTION: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The demise of municipal immunity has introduced a new defendant
into the arena of construction litigation.1 Traditionally, dissatisfied
building owners sued contractors, architects, and electricians to re-
cover for defective structures.2 The shield of sovereign immunity pre-
vented property owners from joining municipal officials as defendants
in suits for negligent building inspection.3 Recently, however, several
jurisdictions have limited municipal immunity in construction litiga-
tion,4 resulting in increased lawsuits against local governments.5
1. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial and statu-
tory abolition of municipal tort immunity). Municipal immunity stems from federal
tort immunity. Governmental tort immunity provides that federal, state, and local gov-
ernments are free from liability for tortious conduct, unless the governing body statuto-
rily consents to be sued. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 626 (5th ed. 1979). See also
Comment, Owen v. City of Independence: The Demise of Municipal Immunity, 21
URB. L. ANN. 241 (1981) (discussing the impact of the Owen Court's decision to elimi-
nate municipal immunity in § 1983 actions).
2. See, e.g., Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983) (building owners sued
developer for collapse of defective sea wall); Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Development Con-
cepts, Corp., 373 So. 2d 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (condominium association sued
both the architect and the contractor for a defective roof).
3. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 156-173 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to the rule
of municipal immunity for negligent building inspection).
5. In recent years, plaintiffs in construction litigation have shifted their attention
from standard construction defendants toward municipalities. Plaintiff building owners
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There is a lack of uniformity among the states concerning the issue
of municipal liability for negligent building inspections.' Some courts
are reluctant to hold a public official to the same degree of care as a
private individual for similar tortious conduct.7 Customarily, a prop-
erty owner brings a negligence action for injuries resulting from the
failure of the municipality's building inspectors to discover a statutory
violation.' Although courts usually find municipalities immune from
liability,9 there is a growing trend toward holding local governments
institute actions against municipal officers claiming that the owners incurred damage by
relying upon municipal approval of building plans and inspection of construction. See
infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
6. For purposes of this Note, "negligent building inspection" refers to all types of
negligent or intentional failure to follow statutory safety inspection codes. "Code" re-
fers to any type of municipal safety code, including building, fire, occupancy, and elec-
tric codes.
In the United States there are several building and safety codes designed to regulate
construction. Three major building codes cover various geographical regions. The Pa-
cific coast region applies the UNIFORM BUILDING CODE. The South follows the
SOUTHERN BUILDING CODE. The BUILDING OFFICIALS CONFERENCE OF AMERICA
(BOCA) BASIC CODE guides construction work in the eastern and central states. These
codes set minimum standards for public safety. Committees of experts on construction,
fire prevention, and engineering developed the codes. See Blawie, Legal Liability of
Building Officials For Structural Failures, 57 CONN. B.J. 211, 213 (1983) (discussing the
Connecticut State Building Code, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-251 to 29-282 (West
Supp. 1988)), parallels the BOCA BASIC BUILDING CODE).
7. Although several jurisdictions enacted tort claims acts restricting governmental
immunity, courts are reluctant to interpret those statutes as imposing liability on munic-
ipalities in the same manner as private tortfeasors. See, eg., Massachusetts Tort Claims
Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1980) (public employers shall
be liable for the negligent acts or omissions of their employees "in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances"). In Dinsky v.
Framingham, 386 Mass. 801, 438 N.E.2d 51 (1982), the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court interpreted this statute to prevent municipal liability for negligent building
inspection. But see Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979) (interpreted Iowa
Tort Claims Act to impose municipal tort liability, based on breach of statutory duty,
similar to private actors).
8. See Annot, 41 A.L.R. 3D 567, 569 (1972). A building owner's battle for recovery
is difficult. Finding negligent inspection by a municipality requires: (1) evidence of a
prior building code violation, (2) the building inspector's negligent act of failing to no-
tice or remedy the violation, and (3) injury or loss of plaintiff's property as a result of
the inspector's negligence. Comment, Local Government Liability in Virginia for Negli-
gent Inspection of Buildings, Structures and Equipment, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 809, 812-
13 (1984).
9. See, eg., Besserman v. Town of Paradise Valley, Inc., 116 Ariz. 471, 569 P.2d
1369 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (town not liable for alleged negligent and malicious inspec-
tion of home); Georges v. Tudor, 16 Wash. App. 407, 556 P.2d 564 (Wash. Ct. App.
1976) (no recovery for injury sustained from alleged negligent performance of building
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liable for personal injuries and loss of property resulting from negligent
building inspections by municipal officials.' 0
When deciding a claim of negligent building inspection, courts must
balance two competing goals: shielding municipalities from the eco-
nomic burden of liability and compensating the victims of a public offi-
cial's tortious conduct.'I This Note focuses on this dichotomy and
explores divergent state approaches to the issue of whether courts
should hold a municipality liable for the negligent failure of its employ-
ees to enforce building safety codes. Specifically, Part II discusses the
decline of the sovereign immunity doctrine as applied to municipal lia-
bility for negligent building inspections. Part III examines distinctions
courts apply to governmental activities to preserve municipal immu-
nity in this area. Finally, Part IV suggests alternatives to the disparate
treatment of municipal liability for the negligent performance of a
building inspector's duties.
II. THE DECLINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The doctrine of sovereign immunity emanated from the English the-
ory that "the King can do no wrong."' 2 Ironically, this maxim origi-
nally meant that the King was not privileged to commit a wrong.'3
inspector's duties); Victoria Village "G" Condominium Ass'n v. City of Coconut Creek,
488 So. 2d 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 497 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1986)
(county not liable for negligent issuance of certificate of occupancy).
10. The recent trend toward imposing liability received much attention. See gener-
ally Comment, Municipal Liability for Negligent Building Inspections-Demise of the
Public Duty Doctrine?, 65 IowA L. REV. 1416 (1980) (analyzing the status of the public
duty doctrine in construction litigation) [hereinafter cited as Demise]; Comment, Mu-
nicipal Liability for Negligent Building Inspection, 23 Loy. L. REv. 458 (1977) (advo-
cating jury trial to determine extent of municipal tort liability in negligent inspection
actions) [hereinafter cited as Comment]; Note, Rebuilding the Wall of Sovereign Immu-
nity; Municipal Liability for Negligent Building Inspection, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 343
(1985) (discussion of municipal liability for negligent inspection under current Florida
law) [hereinafter cited as Rebuilding the Wall]; Note, Municipal Tort Liability for Erro-
neous Issuance of Building Permits: A National Survey, 58 WASH. L. Rv. 537 (1983)
(categorization of the states according to scope of governmental immunity currently
recognized) [hereinafter cited as National Survey]. See infra notes 125-155 and accom-
panying text.
11. See infra notes 176-190 and accompanying text.
12. Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 1-2 (1924-25) [here-
inafter cited as Borchard I].
13. See D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P. SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL GovERN-
MENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 429 (1983) [hereinafter cited as MANDELKER, NETSCH &
SALSICH].
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Inverse application of this principle, however, resulted in the barring of
suits against the sovereign.1" The sovereign immunity doctrine first
barred plaintiffs from seeking redress against the government in the
eighteenth century English case of Russell v. The Men of Devon.1 5 The
Russell rule first appeared in the United States in 1812.16 Most Ameri-
can courts subsequently adopted the governmental tort immunity
principle.1 7
Notwithstanding its mistaken introduction into the American judi-
cial system, 18 proponents of the municipal immunity doctrine have for-
mulated several justifications for its existence.19 Several prevailing
theories support municipal tort immunity: (1) governmental entities
are unique in performing activities not undertaken by private individu-
als;2 (2) a municipality derives no pecuniary benefit from the exercise
of public fumctions;2 ' (3) revenue raised for the public good should not
be used to pay tort judgments;22 and (4) courts should not hold a mu-
14. See Leonard, Municipal Tort Liability: A Legislative Solution Balancing the
Needs of Cities and Plaintiffs, 16 URB. L. ANN. 305, 308 (1979) (discussing traditional
and modem doctrines of governmental tort immunity) [hereinafter cited as Leonard].
15. Russell v. The Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
16. Governmental immunity soon after appeared in the United States in Mower v.
Leicester, 9 Mass. 147 (1812). In Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 366
N.E.2d 1210 (1977), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated its intention to
abrogate the governmental immunity doctrine, followed by the legislature's abrogation,
codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-9 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1980 & Supp.
1987)). In Russell, the English court based its finding of immunity on the fact that
Devon county was unincorporated and thus had no funds to support a judgment for
damages. In Mower, the New England court relied on Russell to deny relief to an indi-
vidual injured by a defective bridge. Mower's reliance on the Russell rationale was mis-
placed since Leicester was incorporated. See Borchard I, supra note 12, at 41-43;
MANDELKER, NETSCH & SALSIcH, supra note 13, at 429-30.
17. See James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI.
L. Rnv. 610, 621-23 (1955) (discussing the evolution of sovereign and governmental
immunity) [hereinafter cited as James].
18. See supra notes 13-16.
19. Borchard, supra note 12, at 41-43, states:
The great majority of the courts... have put the immunity from substantive re-
sponsibility on the ground that the county was created for public purposes, charged
with the performance of duties as an arm or branch of the state government, and
cannot therefore be liable for failure to negligence in the performance of its pub-
lic--sometimes even called corporate-duties.
a at 43.
20. See supra note 19.
21. National Survey, supra note 10, at 539.
22. See Leonard, supra note 14, at 308 n.21. ("DThe public policy rationale behind
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nicipality liable for torts committed in the performance of its govern-
mental duties.2 3
The severity of the local government immunity doctrine led a major-
ity of states to enact legislation that partially waives sovereign immu-
nity." Although many state courts abolished sovereign immunity,
legislation subsequently reinstated immunity for certain actions.25
the early English cases was that it is better for the injured individual to bear the loss
than to inconvenience the public.").
23. Justice Holmes posited this rationale in Kawanakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349,
353 (1907) ("[A] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.").
24. For a thorough classification of the 50 states according to degree of immunity
retained, see National Survey, supra note 10, at 540-47.
Following the judicial abrogation of municipal immunity in Spanel v. Mounds View
School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962), the Minnesota Legisla-
ture adopted the Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 466.01-466.17 (West 1977). The Act provides: "Subject to the limitations of sec-
tions 466.01 to 466.15, every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of
its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties
whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 466.02 (West 1977). Significantly, § 466.03 of the Minnesota statute imposes limited
exceptions under which a municipality will not be held liable in tort. One important
exception immunizes municipalities from liability for torts resulting from the failure or
negligent performance of a discretionary function or duty. MIrN. STAT. ANN.
§ 466.03(6) (West 1977). See Note, Government Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection:
Hague v. Stade, 66 MINN. L. REV. 1164, 1166-67 (1982) (discussing public duty doc-
trine as applied to negligent fire inspection suits) [hereinafter cited as Note, Fire Inspec-
tions].
Many other state legislatures enacted statutes similar to the Minnesota Municipal
Tort Liability Act, defining and greatly restricting state and municipal liability. See
generally ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.50.250-09.50.003 (1973); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 810-
996.6 (West 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West 1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS §§ 1-9
(Michie/Law Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1987)); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 41.0305-41.039 (1985).
25. The first major judicial declaration against maintaining sovereign immunity was
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957). The Hargrove court
stated, "The time has arrived to declare this doctrine anachronistic not only to our
system of justice but to our traditional concepts of democratic government." Id at 132.
Many other state judiciaries abrogated traditional concepts of sovereign immunity.
See, eg., City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962) (abrogating munici-
pal immunity); but see ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070 (1983) (reinstating immunity for cer-
tain actions by a city); Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107
(1963) (abolishing immunity of all public entities); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (abrogating state immunity) (super-
seded by CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1980)); Haney v. City of Lexington,
386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (abolishing municipal immunity); Jones v. State
Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (abrogating state immunity for negli-
gent maintenance of public roads) (superseded by Mo. R~v. STAT. § 537.600 (1986));
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States rejecting immunity differ greatly regarding the degree of munici-
pal tort liability.26 The scope of liability ranges from traditional mu-
nicipal tort immunity, subject only to specific statutory waivers, 27 to its
unqualified abolition.28 A majority of states chose the middle ground
of the immunity spectrum,29 opting for one of two intermediate posi-
tions. Some states approach the liability issue by establishing general
municipal immunity with a considerable number of exceptions.30
Other moderate states impose municipal liability for tortious conduct,
with exceptions for specific activities.31 Despite judicial and statutory
restrictions of the immunity doctrine, and court-created exceptions
limiting municipal liability, 32 building owners lack a guarantee of re-
covery for negligent inspection.3
III. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY
Traditionally, three judicial shields preserved municipal immunity
for negligent building inspection: the governmental-proprietary dis-
tinction; the discretionary-ministerial dichotomy; and the public duty
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) (abrogating state
immunity).
26. See generally Carlisle, Coleman, Fontana, Moskowitz & Smith, Testing the Lim-
its: A Report on the Uncertainties of Governmental Liability in 1982, 14 URB. LAW. 687,
689-697 (1982) (a state by state analysis of various stances on municipal tort liability for
negligent inspection or failure to inspect).
27. See National Survey, supra note 10, at 540-41. "Thirteen states have retained
the traditional common law notion that a municipality is immune from tort liability."
Id In these jurisdictions, courts apply the governmental/proprietary distinction to de-
termine municipal tort liability. Generally, these states classify issuance of building
permits as governmental. Id.
28. See National Survey, supra note 10, at 546. The author describes states advocat-
ing total abolition of sovereign immunity as having a "blanket waiver" of immunity.
This approach requires a courts to define the scope of governmental liability on a case
by case basis. Id
29. Twenty-four states chose a position between the immunity and liability ex-
tremes. Id at 530 n.22.
30. In these jurisdictions, "immunity is the rule and liability is the exception." This
approach restricts the judiciary because liability can only follow after negligent per-
formance of specifically enumerated activities. Id at 542.
31. In these jurisdictions, liability is the rule and immunity the exception. This
approach affords more freedom to the courts to decide when to impose liability. Id. at
543.
32. See infra notes 34-173 and accompanying text (Part III, Judicial Limitations on
Municipal Tort Liability).
33. See supra note 7.
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rule.34 Viewed as a reaction to the abrogation of sovereign immu-
nity,a5 the governmental-proprietary distinction was once a prominent
defense.3 6 The discretionary-ministerial dichotomy, a modification of
the governmental-proprietary distinction, is more popular today. 7
Currently, a majority of jurisdictions employ the public duty doctrine
to bar recovery from a municipality for negligent building
inspections.3 8
A. The Governmental/Proprietary Distinction
Local government law dictates that a municipality is liable for the
torts of its officers if: (1) a master-servant relationship exists between
the municipality and the tortfeasor; (2) the negligent act is within the
scope of the officer's duties; and (3) the negligently performed duty is a
proprietary rather than governmental function.39 The third qualifica-
tion recognizes the dual governing and profit-making character of mu-
nicipalities.' Under the governmental/proprietary analysis, if courts
label the negligent activity proprietary, municipal liability is coexten-
sive with that of a private entity.41 If courts categorize the function as
34. These three judicially created doctrines cushioned the effects of the abrogation
of sovereign immunity. Thus, municipal immunity found continued vitality in the
courts. See generally Leonard, supra note 14, at 312-17.
35. MANDELKER, NETSCH & SALSICH, supra note 13, at 434. Although some com-
mentators believe that courts originally created the governmental/proprietary distinc-
tion to counter the harshness of common law immunity, governments also used the
distinction to avoid liability.
36. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text (discussing the governmen-
tal/proprietary distinction).
37. See infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text (discussing the discretion-
ary/ministerial dichotomy).
38. Although the public duty rule is often criticized for its unjust results and lack of
a sound logical basis, many jurisdictions continue to apply it in negligent building in-
spection actions. See infra notes 95-125 and accompanying text.
39. C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 32.12 (1986);
see also 18 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.02 (3d ed.
1986) (discussing conditions under which municipal tort liability exists).
40. Municipalities engage in governing functions, as well as profit-making proprie-
tary activities. Courts refuse to impose liability if negligent conduct arises from a gov-
ernmental function. E.g., Summerville v. Board of County Road Comm'rs of
Kalamazoo County, 77 Mich. App. 580, 259 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
41. See, eg., Parks v. City of Oklahoma City, 559 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Okla. Ct. App.
1976) ("When [a] City is performing a proprietary function, it has the same responsibil-
ity for the acts of its employees as a private entity in the conduct of that enterprise.")
(superseded by OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 152.1 (West Supp. 1988)); Leonard, supra note 14,
at 311.
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governmental, the municipality is immune from liability.4 2
Courts have taken numerous approaches in classifying a particular
activity as governmental or proprietary.4 3 Some jurisdictions label as
governmental functions that only a municipality can perform.4 4 An-
other test is whether the act is for the common good, or for the munici-
pality's pecuniary gain.45 When a municipality realizes monetary
benefits, courts declare the activity a proprietary function.46 Thus, po-
lice protection is governmental in nature,4 7 and the municipal sale of
mineral water is a proprietary function.4 8
Generally, courts found municipal building inspections to be govern-
mental functions,49 thus barring recovery for negligent inspections as
immune governmental activities.5 ° The governmental/proprietary dis-
tinction, however, caused great confusion.5 1 Dissatisfaction with arbi-
trary line-drawing led courts to retreat from the public versus private
42. See E. McQUILLIN, supra note 39, §§ 53.23-53.24 (citing cases holding munici-
pality immune for governmental functions); see also MANDELKER, NETSCH & SALSICH,
supra note 13, at 431-32 (discussing Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 38 Am.
Dec. 669 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842), the leading case distinguishing between public and pri-
vate functions).
43. See generally Comment, Local Government Liability in Virginia For Negligent
Inspection of Buildings, Structures and Equipment, supra note 8, at 814-16 (discussing
various approaches taken by the Virginia courts to distinguish between governmental
and proprietary acts); Leonard, supra note 14, at 311.
44. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRiS 979-81 (4th ed. 1971);
see also Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977) (munici-
pality insulated from liability for negligent acts of its employees in performance of
strictly public functions imposed or permitted by legislature) (superseded by MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-9 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1987)).
45. Borchard I, supra note 12, at 132-34 ("Immunity has been placed on the ground
that the city derives no pecuniary benefit from the exercise of public functions.").
46. Comment, supra note 10, at 461.
47. E.g., Steele v. City of Houston, 577 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 603 S.W.2d 786 (1980).
48. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
49. See, eg., E. Eyring & Sons Co. v. Baltimore, 253 Md. 380, 252 A.2d 824 (1969)
(court applied a three-part test to determine that city was immune from liability for the
collapse of a church inspected by city, declaring the inspection function governmental
in nature).
50. Id
51. In Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U.S. 352, 362 (1937) (im-
plicitly overruled on other grounds by Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939)),
the Supreme Court noted that no other area of the law causes greater conflict and con-
fusion than that which deals with the differentiation between the governmental and
corporate powers of municipalities. Liability in Virginia, supra note 43, at 814-15 n.49.
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classification of municipal activities."
B. The Discretionary/Ministerial Dichotomy
Rejecting the governmental/proprietary distinction, several courts
preserved some immunity by differentiating between a municipality's
discretionary and ministerial acts.53 Using this approach, courts found
the municipality liable in tort if the questioned activity was ministe-
rial. 4 Courts, however, barred recovery for negligently performed dis-
cretionary duties.55
The discretionary/ministerial analysis insulates the municipality
from liability for tortious conduct resulting from the exercise of an offi-
cial's discretion.56 Discretionary activities, or planning decisions, are
those which require a government official's personal deliberation, deci-
sion, and judgment. 7 Ministerial or operational acts, on the other
hand, are those functions which constitute merely an obedience to or-
ders or the performance of a duty in which the individual has little or
no choice.5" Courts may impose liability for a negligently performed
ministerial act.5 9
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ° which waives sovereign im-
52. See W. PROSSER, supra note 44, at 978-83 (an extensive review of govermmen-
tal/proprietary decisions).
53. See MANDELKER, NETSCH & SALSICH, supra note 13, at 440 ("Despite the dec-
larations concerning the demise of governmental tort immunity, the continued life of
the discretionary-ministerial [nondiscretionary] distinction applied to acts of public offi-
cials suggests that governmental immunity has been modified rather than abolished.").
54. See infra note 58 and accompanying text, defining "ministerial" acts. Eg.,
Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961)
(governmental agent is liable for torts committed when acting in a ministerial capacity)
(superseded by CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1980)).
55. Id Courts often refer to discretionary acts as legislative, judicial, quasi-legisla-
tive, or quasi-judicial functions. See, eg., Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526,
533, 247 N.W.2d 132, 136 (1976).
56. FKg., Muskopf, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (government
officials are not liable for discretionary acts within the scope of their authority) (super-
seded by CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1980)); see generally Comment, supra
note 10, at 464.
57. See W. PROSSER, supra note 44, at 988.
58. Id Discretionary acts require "the employee to look at all the facts and act
upon them in some manner of his own choosing." Leonard, supra note 14, at 314.
59. See E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 39, § 53.33 (citing cases where courts imposed
liability for negligently performed ministerial activities).
60. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
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munity, expressly exempts governments from liability for discretionary
activities.61 Many state statutes modeled after the FTCA also provide
governmental immunity for discretionary functions. 2 Since it derives
from the separation of powers doctrine,63 the discretionary exception
evidences the judicial reluctance to intrude upon the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches of government."4 Tort liability resulting from the ju-
dicial review of governmental discretionary activities constitutes such
an encroachment.6 5
The task of delineating exactly what constitutes a discretionary or
ministerial act confused courts66 because the categories overlap. The
Washington Supreme Court in Evangelical United Brethren Church v.
State68 devised a four prong test to determine the immunity of various
governmental activities. 69 To fall within discretionary immunity under
the Evangelical analysis, the activity must: (1) involve a basic govern-
mental policy, program, or objective; (2) be essential to that policy,
61. The discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act bars:
"(a) [a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government...
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern-
ment. . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
62. See supra note 24 (citing examples of various state statutes waiving sovereign
immunity yet retaining a discretionary function exception). Additionally, several juris-
dictions judicially added the discretionary function exception. See, eg., Commercial
Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Weiss v. Fote, 7
N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
63. MANDELKER, NETSCH & SAISICH, supra note 13, at 446-49.
64. Weiss, 7 N.Y.2d at 585-86, 167 N.E.2d at 66, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 413. The Weiss
court stated:
To accept a jury's verdict as to the reasonableness and safety of a plan of govern-
mental services and prefer it over the judgment of the governmental body which
originally considered and passed on the matter would be to obstruct normal gov-
ernmental operations and to place in inexpert hands what the Legislature has seen
fit to entrust to experts.
Id at 585-86, 167 N.E.2d at 66, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 413. Accord Trianon Park Condomin-
ium Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 918 (Fla. 1985).
65. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d 1020.
66. See Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception to Government Tort Liabil-
ity, 61 MARQ. L. Rnv. 163, 178-82 (1977) (discussing the difficulties courts experience
in applying the discretionary/ministerial distinction).
67. See Leonard, supra note 14, at 315 (no ministerial act is wholly without an
element of judgment-even the driving of a nail involves some discretion).
68. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965). The Evangelical United court judicially
adopted the discretionary function exception.
69. 67 Wash. 2d at 255, 407 P.2d at 445.
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program, or objective; (3) involve the exercise of a basic policy evalua-
tion or judgment; and (4) involve a governmental agency acting within
the scope of its authority.70 If the court answers all four preliminary
questions affirmatively, then the activity is discretionary.7 1 If the court
answers one or more of the questions negatively, the test requires fur-
ther inquiry.72
Several courts found fault with the Evangelical test 73 and attempted
to define further the discretionary/ministerial distinction.'4 Despite its
lack of clarity, courts continue to use the planning/operational dichot-
omy in construction law.75 Judicial findings of discretionary immunity
varied over the years.7 6 In several recent cases, however, courts con-
cluded that municipal inspection of buildings is a ministe-
rial/operational level activity.77 For example, in R. Landsfield v. R.J.
Smith Contractors, Inc. 7' a Michigan court of appeals stated that the
simple determination of whether a construction project meets building
70. Id The Florida Supreme Court adopted the same test in Commercial Carrier
Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979). The Florida courts con-
tinue to apply the Commercial Carrier/Evangelical test. See infra note 124 accompany-
ing text.
71. 67 Wash. 2d at 255, 407 P.2d at 445.
72. Id
73. See generally Comment, How Much Wrong Can the King Do? A Look at the
Modern Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in Florida, 13 STETSON L. REv. 359, 366-67
(1984) (discussing confusion resulting from application of the Evangelical test as applied
in Commercial Carrier and its progeny).
74. See R. Landsfield v. R.J. Smith Contractors, Inc., 146 Mich. App. 637, 639-40,
381 N.W.2d 782, 783 (1985) (quoting Ross v. Consumers Power Co., on reh'g, 420
Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984)); accord Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d
352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
75. See supra notes 57 and 58 and accompanying text.
76. Compare Fiduccia v. Summit Hill Constr. Co., 109 N.J. Super. 249, 262 A.2d
920 (1970) (building inspector's duty of issuing a certificate of occupancy requires con-
siderable skill and judgment and is therefore an immune discretionary activity) with
Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) (conducting statu-
tory inspection of a building is not a quasi-judicial act within the meaning of govern-
mental tort immunity).
77. Eg., K. Landsfield, 146 Mich. App. 637, 381 N.W.2d 782 (township building
inspector's determination of whether construction met code standards is ministerial-
operational in nature); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132
(1976) (building inspection function is ministerial). But see Trianon Park Condomin-
ium Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985) (building inspector en-
forces safety codes pursuant to state police power, thus building inspection is an
immune discretionary function).
78. 146 Mich. App. 637, 381 N.W.2d 782 (1985).
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code specifications is ministerial-operational in nature.79
Similarly, in Manors of Inverrary XII v. Atreco-Florida0 a Florida
court found that the examination of plans and on-site inspections to
determine building code compliance was an operational/ministerial ac-
tivity."' The municipality may thus be liable for the inspector's wrong-
ful conduct.8 2 Manors involved condominium owners who suffered
monetary loss from numerous construction defects. 3 The condomin-
ium association filed a class action suit alleging that the City of
Lauderhill was negligent in approving the building plans, inspecting
the premises, and issuing a building permit and certificate of occu-
pancy. 4 The condominium association introduced evidence that the
building official approved construction which violated the South Flor-
ida Building Code.8 5 In response to the association's allegations, the
city asserted discretionary immunity.8 6 The court framed the issue
before it as whether the activities of a city building inspector, in ap-
proving building plans and construction, are a discretionary-planning
activity or an operational activity. 7 Although the court found the
city's adoption of the South Florida Building Code discretionary,"8 it
concluded that enforcing the building code standards involved purely
ministerial acts. 89
79. 146 Mich. App. at 640, 381 N.W.2d at 783 (action against township alleging
negligent inspection of construction resulting in numerous building defects).
80. 438 So. 2d 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
81. Id at 492.
82. Id
83. Id at 491.
84. Id
85. The City of Lauderhill adopted the South Florida Building Code by a special
legislative act. Id The code sets forth the procedures for obtaining city approval of
construction, which are similar to procedures nationwide. See supra note 6. The code
provides that two sets of plans for the proposed development must accompany an appli-
cation for a building permit. 438 So. 2d at 491. The code requires the building official
to examine the plans for compliance with the building code. Id. If the plans comply, he
or she issues a permit to proceed with construction. Id. The code requires periodic
building inspections. If the construction meets code requirements and the inspector
approves the building, the city issues a certificate of occupancy. Id
86. The city argued that the building official's function is discretionary and is part
of his planning activity, and thus remains cloaked with sovereign immunity. Id.
87. Id
88. The city's choice to use the South Florida Building Code was a discretionary or
planning activity. Id at 491-92.
89. The court applied the four prong test adopted in Commercial Carrier Corp. v.
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These cases illustrate that discretionary immunity is not a viable de-
fense for municipalities in negligent building inspection suits. Based
upon the nature of municipal safety inspection codes, courts will logi-
cally classify a building inspector's duties as ministerial.' Moreover,
both the governmental/proprietary and the discretionary/ministerial
dichotomies are deficient in one important aspect: both fail to address
whether a municipality owes a duty to persons injured as a result of a
negligent building inspection.9 1
C. The Public Duty Rule
As an alternative means of limiting governmental liability, several
jurisdictions adopted the public duty rule.92 The rule provides that an
official responsible to the general public owes no duty to individual
citizens.9 3 Thus, the doctrine essentially distinguishes between public
and private functions.9 4 Courts applying the public duty rule found
that municipal building, fire, safety, and inspection codes benefit the
general public and not individual citizens.9 5 Therefore, to impose mu-
nicipal liability, a citizen must show that the governmental entity owed
Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (1979). See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying
text.
The dissent in Manors was wary of making governmental units insurers of the quality
of construction of private development projects. 438 So. 2d at 495-96. Anticipating
that the construction industry would rely on governmental inspection to establish com-
pliance with building codes, the dissent contended that municipal liability would en-
courage careless construction. Id. at 495.
90. Most building safety inspection codes delineate specific standards. An inspec-
tor's function is to survey plans and construction to see if they meet the requisite condi-
tions. Although this requires an element of judgment, the inspector is merely executing
the product of the legislature. Because of the specificity of these codes, courts are unjus-
tified in treating building inspection as a discretionary function, thereby finding immu-
nity in negligent inspection actions. See R. Landsfield v. R.J. Smith Contractors, Inc.,
146 Mich. App. 637, 640, 381 N.W.2d 782, 783 (1985).
91. Comment, supra note 10, at 467.
92. See generally 38 A.L.R. 4th 1194, 1196 (survey of various states applying the
public duty rule).
93. Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 676, 574 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1978).
94. This distinction parallels that of the governmental/proprietary dichotomy. See
supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
95. E.g., Duran v. Tuscon, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973) (fire inspection
codes benefit the general public not individual victims); Hannon v. Counihan, 54 Ill.
App. 3d 509, 369 N.E.2d 917, 12 I11. Dec. 210 (1977) (inspection codes for building
foundation standards aid the general public not individual plaintiff).
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him or her a special duty.9 6 When an individual plaintiff establishes
this special relationship, the breach of a duty may result in municipal
liability for damages.9 7
The following discussion analyzes decisions of various jurisdictions
regarding whether a municipality's failure to enforce a building code
gives rise to a private cause of action. First, decisions that bar recovery
from a municipality under the general duty/special duty test are ana-
lyzed. The discussion also considers some recent decisions rejecting
the public duty rule.9"
1. States Adopting the Public Duty Rule
States supporting the public duty doctrine hold that municipalities
conduct building inspections exclusively to benefit the general public.
99
The Minnesota Supreme Court established its position on governmen-
tal liability for negligent building inspections in Cracraft v. City of St.
Louis Park oo Cracraft involved the alleged negligent failure of a city
inspector to discover a municipal fire code violation at a high school.11
Denying relief to the injured students, the court reasoned that the
building code required inspections to protect the interests of the munic-
96. See Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801, 804, 438 N.E.2d 51, 53 (1982)
(town not liable for flooding of plaintiff's home due to negligent inspection because
inspector lacked special duty to the plaintiffs).
97. See Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975) (discussed
infra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
98. The public duty doctrine has been sharply criticized by many courts and com-
mentators. See Glannon, The Scope of Public Liability Under the Tort Claims Act: Be-
yond the Public Duty Rule, 67 MASS. L. Rnv. 159 (1982) (discussing application of the
public duty rule in Dinsky).
99. This position is stated in 7 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 24.507 (3d ed. 1981):
The enactment and enforcement of building codes and ordinances constitute a gov-
ernmental function. The primary purpose of such codes and ordinances is to se-
cure to the municipality as a whole the benefits of a well-ordered municipal
government, or as sometimes expressed, to protect the health and secure the safety
of occupants of buildings, and not to protect the personal or property interests of
individuals.
Id at 479.
100. 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979).
101. Approximately a month and a half after a city fire inspector conducted his
routine inspection of the high school, a 55-gallon drum of highly flammable liquid ex-
ploded, injuring several students. Id at 803. The inspector should have recognized that
the oil drum constituted a fire code violation and removed it from the premises. Id.
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ipality as a whole, rather than particular individuals."°2
Minnesota's continuing adherence to the public duty rule1" 3 is
demonstrated by the recent decision of Hage v. Stade,'° which con-
cerned a hotel fire that caused injuries and deaths.'0 The Supreme
Court of Minnesota affirmed the district court's summary dismissal of
the victims' complaint," ° which alleged negligent fire safety code in-
spection and enforcement.' Holding that municipal building and fire
codes create a duty to the general public, the court concluded that the
victims lacked a cause of action against the city."0 8
Massachusetts recently adopted the public duty rule to protect local
governments from liability. In Dinsky v. Framingham"°  the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court used the public duty doctrine to limit
municipal liability for a negligent building inspection." 0 A landowner
sued the Town of Framingham for damages sustained when his prop-
erty was flooded."' The landowner alleged that the town was negli-
gent in issuing building and occupancy permits.1 12 Concluding that
102. Id. at 805. Cracraft enumerated four factors for determining whether to im-
pose liability on the municipality: (1) actual knowledge of the dangerous condition by
the municipality; (2) reasonable reliance by persons on the municipality's representa-
tions and conduct; (3) statutory enumeration of mandatory acts clearly to protect a
particular class of persons, rather than the public as a whole; and (4) use of due care by
the municipality to avoid increasing the risk of harm. Id at 806-07.
The Cracraft court concluded that "[fire] inspections are required for the purpose of
protecting the interests of the municipality as a whole against the fire hazards of the
persons inspected... ." Id at 805.
103. See generally Note, Fire Inspections, supra note 24 (discussing Hage and the
development of Minnesota's adoption of the public duty rule).
104. 304 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 1981).
105. Id. at 285. Sixteen people died when a hotel in Breckenridge burned. Id
106. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state and its
inspection agencies. The plaintiff appealed.
107. Id. The hotel was in violation of the fire code at the time of the fire. Specific
violations included lack of smoke detectors, flammable materials stored in the base-
ment, and absence of sprinklers in the hotel. Id Moreover, in violation of the annual
inspection requirement, the hotel had not been inspected in over two years. Id.
108. Id at 283. The Minnesota Supreme Court relied on the public duty doctrine
to find that the city owed no duty to the hotel fire victims.
109. 386 Mass. 801, 438 N.E.2d 51 (1982).
110. Id
111. 386 Mass. at 802, 438 N.E.2d at 52. The building commissioner issued both
the building permit, as well as the occupancy permit, even though the building failed to
meet department of health requirements regarding the proposed grading and proper
drainage system.
112. Id at 51.
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the town owed no duty to the property owners, the court declared that
the state building code refers only to the public interest.1 13 Massachu-
setts has subsequently applied Dinsky to insulate municipalities from
tort liability,114 indicating the state's continued reliance on the public
duty rule to shield municipalities in negligent building inspection suits.
Florida recently changed its stance regarding the public duty rule.
Despite its prior condemnation of the doctrine, I"5 the Florida Supreme
court returned to the public duty rule in THanon Park Condominium
Association v. City of Hialeah.116 In Trianon the roof of a sixty-five
unit condominium collapsed three years after the City of Hialeah is-
sued a certificate of occupancy. Filing a class action suit, the condo-
minium association alleged that the city was negligent in approving
building plans, inspecting the construction, and issuing a certificate of
113. Id at 55. In reaching its conclusion, the Dinsky court looked to other jurisdic-
tions that addressed the issue of municipal liability for negligent building inspection.
The court agreed with the states which hold that a city owes a duty only to the general
public. Id
114. C.f Connerty v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 398 Mass. 140, 495 N.E.2d 840
(1986) (municipal corporation lacked duty to licensed master clam digger for damages
to his business allegedly caused by discharge of raw sewage into harbor by municipal
corporation); Appleton v. Town of Hudson, 397 Mass. 812,494 N.E.2d 10 (1986) (town
lacked duty to individuals killed by drunk driver despite alleged negligence of municipal
officials).
115. The state of Florida has an inconsistent history regarding municipality liability
for the negligence of municipal employees. Florida specifically renounced the sovereign
immunity doctrine in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957)
(superseded by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West 1986)). See supra note 25. Ten years
later, however, Florida established a new means of shielding municipalities from liabil-
ity. In Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967) the Florida Supreme
Court adopted the public duty doctrine. Modlin arose when an overhead storage mez-
zanine in a store collapsed and killed a customer. Rejecting the court of appeals deter-
mination that the building inspection function was discretionary, the Florida Supreme
Court applied the public duty doctrine to find the city not liable. Id. at 73-76.
Florida changed its stance again in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979). See supra notes 62, 70. In Commercial Carrier,
applying the discretionary/ministerial distinction, the Florida Supreme Court refused to
find the city liable for the negligence of municipal employees. 371 So. 2d at 1019. The
court rejected the public duty doctrine adopted in Modlin, stating:
[W]e believe it to circuitous reasoning to conclude that no cause of action exists for
a negligent act or omission by an agent of the state or its political subdivisions
where the duty breached is said to be owed to the public at large but not to any
particular person. This is the "general duty-special duty" dichotomy emanating
from Modlin. By less kind commentators, the theory has been characterized as one
which results in a duty to none where there is a duty to all.
Id at 1015.
116. 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
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occupancy. The trial court found that the city breached its duty to the
association by failing to enforce the code provisions properly.117 Using
a discretionary/ministerial analysis, the Florida appellate court af-
firmed the trial court's judgment against the city.11 In a split decision,
the Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision,119
holding the city immune from liability for its police functions, includ-
ing negligent building inspection.12 Applying a general duty/special
duty test, the court found that city building inspectors owed no duty to
individual citizens.121 Relying on basic negligence principles, the court
reasoned that government liability can be based only on a common law
or statutory duty.1 22 The court refused to find a common law duty
owed to individuals that required a governmental entity to enforce the
law. 123
In addition to applying the general duty/special duty test, the Tria-
non court employed the planning/operational analysis and declared
building inspection a discretionary activity.124 The court's broadening
of the discretionary exception immunizes a majority of governmental
activities. Thus, in Florida, municipal immunity in negligent inspec-
117. Id. at 915. The condominium association sued the developers as well as the
City of Hialeah. Id. The parties settled action against the developer and the jury re-
turned a verdict against the city in the amount of $29 1,000. 1d, The court reduced the
award by the amount of the settlement with the developer and further limited it to the
amount of recovery permissible under Florida's tort liability act. Id
Florida enacted a tort claims act which provides that state and local governments,
and their agents, shall be liable for tort claims to the same extent as private individuals.
FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1986). See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Section
768.28(5) limits liability to $100,000 for a claim by one person to the aggregate sum of
$200,000 per action, and prohibits recovery of punitive damages. FLA. STAT.
§ 768.28(5) (1986). See infra Part IV(B) of this Note, notes 191-194.
118. 423 So. 2d 911 (Fla. App. 1982). The appellate court concluded that the city's
inspection and certification of buildings is an operational level activity subject to tort
liability if negligently performed. Id. at 913. The court reversed the trial court damage
award of $50,000, holding the city liable instead for $100,000. Id at 914.
119. Id. at 912.
120. Id. at 919, 923.
121. Id. at 917-18, 923.
122. Id. at 917.
123. Id at 918. The court cited the RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315
(1964). The court reasoned that because the city had no duty to force developers to
comply with the codes, the city had no duty to the victims injured by noncompliance.
Id. See Rebuilding the Wall, supra note 10, at 355-59.
124. 468 So. 2d at 918-19. To determine whether the municipality should be liable
for negligent building inspection, the court applied the Evangelical test adopted by the
Florida court in Commercial Carrier. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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tion suits is the rule rather than the exception.
1 25
2. States Rejecting the Public Duty Rule
States that have rejected the public duty doctrine relied on the same
common law principles of duty applied in actions between private indi-
viduals. These state courts hold that a special duty arises when a build-
ing official undertakes an inspection. In view of the abrogation of
sovereign immunity, these jurisdictions find the general duty/special
duty doctrine no longer viable.
Although its state legislature has since reversed the judicial trend,
Alaska was the first jurisdiction to renounce specifically the public duty
rule.'26 In Adams v. State, like Hage,'27 the victims of a hotel fire al-
leged their injuries resulted from the city's negligent fire safety inspec-
tion.128 The state asserted that the inspector owed a duty only to the
general public and not to any individual.129 Rejecting the state's argu-
ment, the court held the public duty doctrine inapplicable for two rea-
sons. First, the duty imposed by the fire inspection was not a duty to
the public at large.' 3° Rather, the fire safety codes created a duty to a
limited class of beneficiaries-those injured in the hotel fire.' 3 ' Second,
the court stated that the public duty doctrine is really a form of sover-
eign immunity.'3 2 The court found that the judicially-created doctrine
125. See generally Rebuilding the Wall, supra note 10; Note, How Much Wrong Can
the King Do? A Look at the Modern Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in Florida, 13 STET-
SON L. REv. 359 (1984).
126. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976) (superseded by ALASKA
STAT. § 09.65.070 (1983)). The statute, amended in 1977, states:
No action for damages may be brought against a municipality or any of its agents
... if the claim... is based on the failure of the municipality, or its agents, officers,
or employees, when the municipality is neither owner nor lessee of the property
involved ... to inspect property... discover a violation of any statute.., to abate
a violation... or a hazard to health or safety.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070(c) & (d) (1987).
127. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
128. 555 P.2d at 236-38. Eight persons died in the hotel fire. More than eight
months prior to the fire, the state undertook a fire safety inspection and found several
significant hazards. Id. Although the inspector discussed the code violations with the
hotel manager, the inspector took no further steps to remedy the violations. Id.
129. Id. at 241.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id at 24142. The court stated, "We consider that the 'duty to all, duty to no
one' doctrine is in reality a form of sovereign immunity, which is a matter dealt with by
statute in Alaska, and not to be amplified by court-created doctrine."
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contradicted Alaska's statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.133
Relying in part on the Adams rationale, the Iowa Supreme Court in
Wilson v. Nepstad"3 rejected the public duty defense to municipal lia-
bility for negligent building inspections. 35 Wilson consisted of five
consolidated cases involving deaths and injuries resulting from a fire in
a municipally inspected apartment building.136 The injured residents
sued the City of Des Moines, 37 alleging that building code ordinances
required the city to perform inspections and enforce the safety
codes.13 The residents asserted that the city's negligent inspection139
seven months earlier had caused the fire.1  Contending that munici-
pal inspection laws protect the general public, the city claimed it lacked
a duty of care to the fire victims."I Reversing the trial court's dismis-
sal, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a municipality may be liable in
tort for negligent inspections conducted pursuant to state statutes and
city ordinances. 42 Although it noted the trend toward municipal lia-
bility for negligent building inspections, 43 the court refrained from de-
termining the validity of the general duty/special duty distinction.'"
Instead, the court examined the specific and novel language of Iowa's
statutory waiver of tort immunity 45 and concluded that the legislature
intended to impose liability on municipalities for negligent inspection
133. See supra note 132.
134. 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979).
135. Id. at 674.
136. Id. at 666.
137. Id.
138. Id
139. Id at 667. Plaintiffs contended the city was liable for: (1) breach of the com-
mon law duty of reasonable care, and (2) breach of various statutory duties relating to
building and fire safety inspection. Id
140. Id. at 666.
141. Id at 667. Citing eight jurisdictions adhering to the public duty doctrine, the
city urged the court to apply the doctrine in this case. Id.
142. Id at 673.
143. Id. at 667. The court pointed out that the "'public duty' doctrine has lost
support in four of the eight jurisdictions relied upon by the city." Id See supra note
141.
144. Id at 668 ("Although this [public duty doctrine] is a well-respected doctrine,
we do not find it applicable here.") (quoting Adams, 555 P.2d at 241-42; see supra note
126).
145. Id at 669-72. See generally Demise, supra note 10, at 1430-44 (criticizing the
Wilson court's treatment and interpretation of the Iowa statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity).
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and enforcement of building safety codes. 146
Wisconsin recently ruled on municipal building inspector liability in
Wood v. Milin.147 In Wood, homeowners sued the building and plumb-
ing inspector of the Town of Vernon following the partial collapse of
their residence.148 The homeowners alleged that the inspector negli-
gently failed to detect building and plumbing code violations that
caused the house to collapse.149 Affirming the circuit court's ruling in
favor of the homeowners, 150 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
the public duty doctrine was inconsistent with the state's law of munic-
ipal tort liability. 151
The Wood court relied on the earlier landmark decision in Coffey v.
City of Milwaukee152 that rejected the public duty doctrine.15 Declar-
ing the public duty/private duty distinction artificial, Coffey held that
any duty owed to the public generally is also owed to individual citi-
zens. 154 Thus, Wisconsin courts strongly adhere to the rule of munici-
pal liability for negligent building inspections.155
146. Id at 669 ("[I]t is the specific and novel language of the Iowa statutes, clearly
indicating a legislative intent to impose liability under these admitted circumstances,
which distinguishes Iowa law from that found in the decisions relied on by the city.").
147. 397 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1986).
148. Id
149. Id at 480. At trial, the court hearA expert testimony that the construction and
location of the rafters and floor joists were defective and in violation of the building
code. Id Plaintiffs also introduced evidence that plumbing code violations contributed
to the home's collapse. Id
150. The trial jury found the town building and plumbing inspector negligent in
performing his inspection duties. Id Thejury verdict awarded $60,183.02 to the home-
owners. Id The circuit court modified the damages award. See infra Part IV(B) of this
Note, notes 191-194.
151. 397 N.W.2d at 482.
152. 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).
153. Wisconsin previously rejected the public duty doctrine in Holytz v. Milwau-
kee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). The Coffey court stated: "The 'public
duty'-'special duty' distinction espoused in the cases cited by the City of Milwaukee
and LeGrand [building inspector] set up just the type of artificial distinction between
'proprietary' and 'governmental' functions which this court sought to dispose of in
Holytz." 247 N.W.2d at 139.
154. Id See supra note 153.
155. No judges dissented in either Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976),
or Wood, 397 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1986).
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D. Common Exceptions
Regardless of the jurisdiction's stance on the public duty rule, courts
generally impose municipal liability in certain distinct situations. Two
such situations are the inherently dangerous exception and the special
relationship exception.156
1. The Inherently Dangerous Situation
Some jurisdictions impose liability when a building official should
have detected, or had actual knowledge of an inherently dangerous
code violation.157 Although New York adheres to the public duty doc-
trine,' 5 in Gannon Personal Agency Inc. v. City of New York' 59 the
court attached municipal liability for an explosion resulting from a
building official's negligent failure to detect an improperly fitted gas
line in a restaurant.'6
The inherently dangerous situation exception is part of a foreseeabil-
156. A third situation in which many jurisdictions will impose liability is when the
plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class which the statute in question was intended
to protect. See, eg., Runkel v. City of New York, 282 A.D. 173, 177, 123 N.Y.S.2d
485,489 (1953), aff'd, 286 A.D. 1101, 145 N.Y.2d 729 (1955) (plaintiffs are members of
a class that statutes intended to protect and therefore may sue to recover for personal
injuries); Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96, 103 (Minn. 1977) (pollu-
tion control statutes benefit both the general public and individuals living near the solid
waste disposal sites). See generally Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801,
807 n.10 (Minn. 1979), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 100-102.
157. Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806. Cf Hansen v. City of St. Paul, 298 Minn. 205,
214 N.W.2d 346 (1976) (city held liable for official's negligence in failing to impound
street dogs known by officials to be vicious and prone to attack).
158. See Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1965)
(leading New York case adopting the public duty rule to shield municipality from liabil-
ity in a negligent inspection action arising from a fatal apartment building fire).
159. 103 Misc. 2d 60, 425 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1979), aff'd, 438 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1981),
rev'd sub nom O'Connor v. New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d
485 (1983)). The Court of Appeals of New York reversed and remanded the lower
court's decision. The court refused to find a special relationship between the injured
plaintiffs and the city that would result in liability for negligent inspection. 447 N.E.2d
at 34-35. See infra text accompanying notes 163-173 for discussion of the special rela-
tionship inspection.
160. 103 Misc. 2d 60,425 N.Y.S.2d 446. Gannon involved a gas explosion in a New
York City restaurant that killed twelve people and left many other injured. Id at 62,
425 N.Y.S.2d at 448. A private contractor who put a new type of gas line in the restau-
rant failed both to install a shut-off valve inside the building in case of a leak and to cap
and close the end of one gas pipe. Id at 65, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 448. Although these two
serious errors were obvious code violations, they went unnoticed by the building inspec-
tor who issued an official approval. Idr
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ity test articulated by courts addressing the issue of negligent building
inspection liability.16 ' For example, one court stated that whether an
actionable duty exists depends on whether the building inspector could
have foreseen that negligence in performing his duties might result in
personal harm.
62
2. The Special Relationship Exception
In most negligent inspection suits, defendant municipalities assert
that they lack a duty to the victims of an official's tortious conduct.1 63
Some jurisdictions, however, make an exception to the general rule of
nonliability if a relationship developed between an injured plaintiff and
an agent of the municipality."6
Although the State of Washington followed the public duty doctrine
at the time,'16 in Campbell v. The City of Bellevue 166 the court found
the city liable for an electrical inspector's negligence.1 67 The inspector
discovered violations of the city's electrical ordinances in an underwa-
ter lighting system 16 and assured the plaintiff that he would remedy
the problem.1 69 The inspector's failure to comply with the code and
disconnect the lighting system resulted in the electrocution of the
plaintiff's decedent.' 70 According to the Campbell court, the inspec-
tor's knowledge of the lighting system's violations and the extreme
danger it posed to the residents created a special relationship between
161. See Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) (Wis-
consin Supreme Court rejected the public duty doctrine and held the city liable for
negligent inspection because it was foreseeable that a building inspector's negligence
might harm someone).
162. Wood v. Milin, 397 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Wis. 1986).
163. See supra Part III(C) (notes 92-125 and accompanying text).
164. Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806-07 (Minn. 1979). See
generally National Survey, supra note 10, at 549-52.
165. The Supreme Court of Washington rejected the public duty doctrine in 1981 in
J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 942, 631 P.2d 1002 (1981). Therefore,
the Supreme Court of Washington decided Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1,
530 P.2d 234 (1975), when the state's courts still adhered to the public duty rule. See
also Note, Campbell v. City of Bellevue: Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspections,
12 WLLiAMETrE L.J. 188 (1975).
166. 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975).
167. 85 Wash. 2d at 10, 530 P.2d at 239.
168. Id at 4, 530 P.2d at 236.
169. Id
170. Id at 4-5, 530 P.2d at 235-36. The plaintiff's wife was electrocuted while try-
ing to save her son who had fallen into a creek. Id
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the victims and the municipality."' 1 In turn, this relationship created a
duty on the part of municipality toward the individual victims, rather
than merely toward the general public.17 2 By the inspector's breach of
that duty, the city incurred liability.173
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO RESOLVE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF
MuNIcIPAL LIABILrrY
Although the law is unsettled, there is a trend toward holding mu-
nicipalities liable for the negligence of their building inspectors. 174 To
analyze the conflicting positions on negligent municipal inspections,
one must examine the two conflicting goals: shielding municipalities
from the economic burden of liability and compensating the victims of
a public official's tortious conduct.'75 The following section looks at
the policy arguments in favor of these goals and proposes two alterna-
tives to the disparate treatment of municipal liability.
A. Policy Arguments
1. Arguments Favoring Municipal Immunity for Negligent
Inspection
Advocates of municipal immunity argue that imposing liability on
municipalities for negligent inspections would deplete municipal funds
and promote carelessness in the construction industry.
The predominant concern is that imposing liability for negligent in-
spection would make the governmental entity and its taxpayers insur-
ers for all construction defects. 176 One court contended that approving
171. lId at 10, 530 P.2d, at 239. The court reasoned that since the inspector under-
took the inspection and conferred with the residents regarding code violations, he
thereby created a special relationship between himself and the plaintiff's decedent. Id
172. Id Although the court recognized a general rule of nonliability, it explained
that the building inspector's surveillance of the defective underwater lighting system,
and his subsequent assurance to dhe residents that he would remedy the problem, caused
the plaintiff to rely on his representations, thereby imposing a duty on the municipality
to the plaintiff's decedent. Id at 5, 530 P.2d at 236.
173. Id. at 10, 530 P.2d at 239. Other courts applied the special relationship excep-
tion to find municipal liability for negligent inspection. E.g., Smullen v. City of New
York, 28 N.Y.2d 66, 268 N.E.2d 763, 320 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1971) (plaintiff's decedent re-
lied upon inspector's assurance that a trench in violation of codes did not need shoring
shortly before the trench collapsed and killed him).
174. See supra notes 126-173 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
176. In Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912,
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liability for negligent building inspections would open a Pandora's box,
making municipal taxpayers fiscally responsible for many other gov-
ernmental activities. 177 Local governments assert that deficiencies in
building inspection operations are due to insufficient municipal
funds.'18 Thus, supporters of municipal immunity assert that imposing
tort liability would only exacerbate current problems.' 79
A second argument is that municipal liability would encourage the
construction industry to maintain lax standards. Proponents of munic-
ipal immunity assert that the government's duty is merely to enforce
compliance with building codes. 8 Under this view, private contrac-
tors are legally and fiscally responsible for penalties resulting from code
violations and neglect in municipal inspection. Moreover, even when
liability is imposed, building inspectors lack an incentive to perform
because a city will indemnify its employees.181 Public policy dictates
that governments should not be responsible for ensuring the quality of
buildings constructed or purchased by individuals. 82 Rather, the
proper remedy for faulty construction lies in an action against the con-
tractor, developer, or seller.'8 3
2. Justifications for Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspection
The primary impetus for imposing municipal liability is the injustice
of denying an injured plaintiff recovery from the government for its
tortious conduct. Proponents of municipal liability contend that the
922 (1985), the court stated: "To give effect to Trianon's position would make the
taxpayers of each government entity liable for the failure of governmental inspectors to
use due care in enforcing the construction requirements of the building code. It would
make the governmental entity and its taxpayers insurers for all building construction
defects."
177. Id. The Trianon court also stated: "If we approved this principle for building
inspections, we would also necessarily have to find governmental entities and their tax-
payers fiscally responsible for the failure to use due care in carrying out their power to
enforce compliance with laws regarding fire department inspections, elevator inspec-
tions." Id
178. See Young, Tort Judgments Against Cities: the Sky's The Limit, 1983 DET.
C.L. REv. 1509 (Mayor of Detroit discusses the permutations of municipal liability)
[hereinafter cited as The Sky's The Limit].
179. Id at 1510.
180. See National Survey, supra note 10, at 560.
181. Id
182. Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912,
919-23 (1985).
183. Id at 923.
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imposition of liability will motivate local governments to conduct dili-
gent inspections"84 and will emphasize the accountability of building
inspectors.1" 5 Municipal liability might best insure against future neg-
ligent building inspections because the threat of liability would increase
the care with which government officials supervise their
subordinates. 1
86
Courts imposing municipal liability reject the argument that failure
to exempt the municipality from its negligence would result in financial
disaster for several reasons.187 First, the financial consequences of leg-
islation are the responsibility of the legislature and should not impede
judicial statutory interpretation. 8 Second, the city may be able to re-
cover against the offending building owner.189 Finally, state statutes
imposing monetary limits on the amount recoverable in municipal tort
liability suits safeguard against the depletion of municipal funds.1"
This limit on municipal liability is the focus of the following section.
B. Placing a Cap on Damages
As the trend of imposing municipal liability for negligent building
inspection continues, many jurisdictions will retreat from their hard
line immunity stance. To cushion the impending shift in liability, state
legislatures may enact statutes limiting the amount recoverable from a
governmental entity for negligent acts. This alternative satisfies the
goals of both sides of the municipal liability debate. Although a recov-
ery limit may offer plaintiffs the prospects of reduced recoveries, 19 1 it
does offer some recourse to victims of government torts. At the same
time, a cap on damages pacifies governmental fears about depletion of
184. See Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 673-74 (1979) ("Municipalities are
not going to be motivated toward meaningful inspections while insulated from their
employees' negligence with respect to these statutory duties.").
185. Id The Wilson court implied that the threat of liability would motivate in-
spectors to perform their duties in a manner responsible enough to justify occupants'
reliance.
186. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 n.36 (1980).
187. Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 n.W.2d 664, 674 (1979). See infra text accompanying
notes 188-190.
188. Id.
189. Id (citing Runkel v. Homelsky, 286 A.D. 1101, 145 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1955)).
190. See infra text accompanying notes 191-94.
191. The Sky's The Limit, supra note 178, at 1510-11.
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municipal funds.192 Several states have already enacted statutes limit-
ing monetary recovery in governmental tort actions. 193 Such statutes
allow courts to hold municipalities liable under the state statutory
waiver of immunity without being concerned with the potentially disas-
trous financial consequences to cities. 194
C. Privatization of the Building Inspection Function
Although most construction law disputes consider building inspector
negligence, the liability debate has overlooked the implications of ig-
noring deficiencies in the building inspection system. The current ap-
proach addresses the issue whether to impose liability after the damage
occurs. Societal interest requires remedying the problem in its pre-in-
jury stages. Municipalities maintain that they lack the resources to fi-
nance improvements in the current inspection system. Likewise,
municipalities have insufficient funds to pay tort judgments. Applica-
tion of this circular analysis leaves citizens in substandard buildings.
Municipalities claim that imposing liability will ultimately result in
the curtailment of building inspections. One court asserted that failing
to inspect is better than negligently inspecting.'95 Since building in-
spection is a vital safeguard against injury to individual occupants, this
proposition is clearly infeasible. The same court suggested that in the
event of municipal withdrawal from the building inspection function,
private agencies might fill the void.' 96 This novel suggestion requires
192. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. See also The Sky's The Limit,
supra note 178, at 1511. Advocating a cap on damages, Mayor Young of Detroit stated:
Some maximum or cap must be placed on cities' liability for compensation for
various kinds of losses, as is done with worker's compensation. In this way, when
the city is at fault, the citizen will be fairly compensated yet the taxpayers will be
protected against jury-ordered windfalls which bear no relationship to the loss
suffered.
Id
193. See supra notes 150 & 177 (examples of cases applying statutes that limit the
amount recoverable in a tort action against a municipality). Such statutes generally
limit the amount recoverable to approximately $100,000-300,000 and prohibit punitive
damage awards. See, eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-102 (1975); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44.070; MiNN. STAT. § 466-04 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.82 (West Supp.
1982).
194. See Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 674 (1979). The Wilson court stated
that the financial consequences of legislation must be the primary responsibility of the
legislature and cannot weigh heavily in the court's function of interpreting statutory
language. Id
195. Id. at 673.
196. Id. at 674.
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examining "privatization" of the inspection function.
If one of the causes of negligent building inspection is a lack of suffi-
cient manpower and funds, state legislatures should consider "priva-
tization," or delegating the inspection function to the private sector.197
Privatization is a means of financing and managing traditionally public
works by private ownership under service contracts with municipal or
state governments.19" In recent years, privatization has become an at-
tractive alternative to local government units responding to federal
budget cutbacks and demands from citizens for public improvement. 99
Although the field of privatization is still in its infancy, it has at-
tracted much attention.'1 Advocates contend that private businesses
can provide public services more efficiently and cheaply than can gov-
ernment.201 A number of rationales support private delegation of mu-
nicipal functions. First, it may be substantially cheaper for
government to contract an activity to private actors.202 Second, em-
ployers can base staffing and salaries on qualifications without the limi-
tations of civil service." 3 Third, private programs have a greater
197. See Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647 (1986)
(analyzing the constitutional implications of privatization of governmental powers)
[hereinafter Private Exercise].
198. See Solmssen, An Introduction to Privatization, 9 URB., ST. & Loc. NEWSL. 1
(No. 1 Fall 1985) (informative introduction to the concept behind privatization) [here-
inafter An Introduction].
199. Id Typically, privatization projects entail a municipality contracting with a
private corporation which provides the necessary capital, builds the necessary operating
facilities, and conducts the activity at a predetermined standard. Id Usually, there is a
long-term service contract between the municipality and the service provider. Id. This
is an attractive arrangement for private investors because they have an extended period
of time in which to pay their obligations. Id.
200. See generally Ewel, Privatization Comes of Age, 17 NAT. RES. L. NEWSL. 1
(No. 1 Winter 1986) (privatization as applied in environmental functions); Cikins,
Privatization of the American Prison System: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 2 No-
TRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 445 (1986) (discussing privatization of the prison
industries) [hereinafter Cikins]; Babitsky, Comparative Performance in Urban Bus
Transit: Assessing Privatization Strategies, 46 PuB. AD. REv. 57 (1986) (commenting on
the advantages and disadvantages of privatization of mass urban transit systems); Frug,
The Choice Between Privatization and Publicization, 9 URB., ST. & LOc. L. NEWSL. 2
(No. 4 Summ. 1986) (criticizing privatization for reducing public involvement in gov-
erning municipal activities) [hereinafter The Choice].
201. See An Introduction, supra note 198, at 1.
202. See Private Exercise, supra note 197, at 657.
203. See Cikins, supra note 200, at 456-57 (discussing operational advantages and
disadvantages of privatization).
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
294 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:267
capacity for flexible responses to new conditions. 2" Finally, the profit
incentive increases the possibility of service improvements.2 "5
As applied to the building inspection function, privatization is a de-
sirable alternative to the current municipal system. Presently, munici-
palities have a monopoly on the inspection function. Negligent
inspection problems arise because municipalities are unable to perform
their responsibility. Municipalities claim that insufficient funding and
staffing cause negligence.206 Despite the proffered justifications, mu-
nicipalities clearly are unable to perform the job well. Therefore, legis-
latures should place the inspection function in the hands of the private
sector.
Privatization of the building inspection function would end the de-
bate over whether to impose municipal liability for a building official's
negligence. If a negligence action arises, courts could impose liability
on the private inspection firm.207 The profit incentive and the threat of
liability would motivate private inspectors to conduct responsible in-
spections. Moreover, private firms would have access to levels of ex-
pertise generally unavailable to governments.20 8  Thus, a building
inspection would be more than a superficial review of plans and struc-
tures.20 9 Rather, a private firm could supply inspectors with the skills
necessary to detect latent faults and defects in construction.
204. Private Exercise, supra note 197, at 654-55. Government operates under spe-
cial demands for consistency and regularity that do not apply to private actors. Id.
Private corporations can operate with greater flexibility, enabling them to react well to
new developments and problems. Id In turn, this tends to speed up the decision-mak-
mng process.
205. Cikins, supra note 200, at 457. However, greed could permeate governmental
functions that were previously shielded from the effects of private self-interest, ulti-
mately leading to corruption. See The Choice, supra note 200, at 17.
206. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
207. Although initially the insurance premiums would be high for these private sur-
veillance firms, many privatization projects are based on some form of tax-exempt fi-
nancing plan in which a governmental entity issues tax-exempt industrial development
bonds and lends the proceeds to a private party who constructs and owns the facility.
An Introduction, supra note 198, at 1. Thus, the initial expenditure is assisted by the
state or local government.
208. See Private Exercise, supra note 197, at 656-57. Often, a highly qualified per-
son may be too expensive for the government to hire, or may not desire to work for the
government for other reasons. Id A private inspection firm therefore may be able to
attract employees of greater expertise than those hired by the government. Id.
209. Several building inspectors in rapidly developing areas, such as Florida, have
an overwhelming number of inspections to conduct each day. The result is often a
superficial review of plans for construction, or a stroll through a construction site, look-
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V. CONCLUSION
Municipal liability for negligent building inspection is a controver-
sial area. Notwithstanding judicial and statutory abolition of sovereign
immunity, many jurisdictions continue to shield municipalities from
liability for the tortious conduct of their officers. Court-created doc-
trines that distinguish between governmental activities help preserve
municipal immunity for negligent building inspections.
Currently, there is a trend toward imposing municipal liability for
the negligent performance of a building inspector's duties. This move-
ment is justified because present and potential building occupants rely
on a municipal inspector's decision that the structure meets safety code
standards. Municipalities fear that imposition of liability will deplete
municipal funds. State legislatures, however, can prevent financial
hardship by enacting statutes limiting the amount recoverable in mu-
nicipal tort actions.
Although placing a cap on damages is a helpful alternative, it fails to
remedy the deficiencies in the municipal inspection system. Local gov-
ernments should recognize their inability to properly carry out the in-
spection function and should relinquish their monopoly on surveillance
to the private sector. Although holding a municipality liable for the
negligent performance of its building officials will afford postdamage
recourse to injured victims and assure accountable inspection, priva-
tization of the inspection function will best deter violations and prevent
injuries. Legislatures should implement privatization, placing the soci-
etal responsibility for safe buildings on the private sector.
Joyce E. Levowitz*
ing only for very obvious defects. Such inspections were condemned by the Wilson
court. See supra notes 194-195 and accompanying text.
Privatization of the inspection function would avoid this type of negligent inspection
for two reasons: (1) privately hired inspectors would have the requisite expertise to
thoroughly survey the buildings and structures for hazardous defects and faults; and
(2) the threat of personal liability would, motivate private firms to stay abreast of their
employees. Moreover, local governments could continue to oversee inspections by de-
termining the standards that private firms must enforce.
* J.D. 1988, Washington University.
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